Introduction
Corporate governance is crucial to the integrity of corporations, financial institutions, and central to the health and stability of economies. Corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way a corporation (or company) is directed, administered or controlled. Cherupalli (2011) explained that Sound corporate governance is reliant on external marketplace commitment and legislation, plus a healthy board culture which safeguards policies and processes as mentioned by. Every business endeavour involves risks that could present threats to its success, and management of such is crucial to the business. Risk is the chance that an investment's actual return will be different from the expected, that is; the quantifiable likelihood of loss or less-thanexpected returns. It includes the possibility of losing some or all of the original investment. Munger (2011) suggests that Risk should be measured, avoided if possible, and a margin of safety determined. Sloan (2011) mentioned that banking by nature of its operations is highly risky. Banks safeguard money and provide credit and render payment services such as checking accounts, debit cards, and cashier's checks. Banks may also offer investment and insurance products. Sobodu & Akiode (1998) opined that through the financial intermediation function and the spread of bank branches, they were relied on to take result-oriented approach to export promotion, diversification and the revamping of industrial development and growth in Nigeria.
Discovery of the causes of an economic phenomenon is very crucial to the future prevention mechanisms and sustainability of the recovered system. The recent global financial crisis was caused by some phenomenal factors. In a research study by Ernst & Young (2010) , it was found that the financial crisis exposed inherent weakness in the risk management system; soiled infrastructures, disparate systems and processes, fragmented decision-making, inadequate forecasting and a dearth of cohesive reporting, among others. The Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (2008) mentioned that many of the causal factors that caused the financial crisis seem to be inextricably linked to a noncompliance with corporate governance policies.
Nigerian Financial Sector Crisis
The Nigerian banking sector is sensitive to the economic and financial wellbeing of the country. Soludu (2009) stated that the financial system is dominated by the banking sector (about 90% of the assets and about 65% of the market capitalization of the Nigerian Stock Exchange). It is the key driver of the economy with new credit to the private sector expected to exceed the combined spending by three tiers of government. In 2005, this sector experienced a major reform as banks were consolidated through mergers and acquisitions, raising the capital base from N2 billion to a minimum of N25 billion, which reduced the number of commercial banks from 89 to 25 and later to 24 and currently 16. Sanusi (2011) mentioned that beyond the need to recapitalize the banks, the reforms focused on ensuring minimal reliance on the public sector for funds, but rather relying on the private sector. In a research study by Ernst and Young (2010) , it was found that as the focus on risk intensifies, organizations are enhancing their management of key risks, which include: credit risk as top of the agenda; operational risk, liquidity risk, market risk, and reputational risk.
Credit risk which is placed as a priority is explained by Chin (2010) as the possibility of loss due to a debtor's non-payment of a loan or other line of credit (either the principal, interest or both). The default events include a delay in repayments, restructuring of borrower repayments, bankruptcy of the firm and has negative consequences for the economy. Chike-obi (2011) revealed that over N770 billion has been spent by the government on buying the bad loans of Nigerian banks.
In a research study by Barfield & Venkat (2010) , it was found that during the times of financial crisis, risks have repeatedly shown a tendency to transform from one type to another with breath-taking speed. We have seen, for example, how mistrust of asset values due to credit default risk can generate The financial crisis in the Nigerian Banking Sector can be specifically attributed to the huge loss suffered by most of the banks in the form of non-performing loans which suggests poor credit risk management. In a research study by Soludo (2009) , it was discovered that 8 of the Nigerian banks had issued out loans without observing due process, also some loans were not serviced and no action was taken by the bank which resulted in N620billion loss for poor credit management. This draws attention to the effectiveness and efficiency of their credit risk management principles, which in turn questions their compliance with corporate governance policies.
Corporate Governance
In 
Agency Theory
The main issue in the principal/agency literature is centred on asymmetric information because outside owners do not have access to full information on corporate performance or the reasons for underperformance. Sadiq, Oyebola & Abdulrasheed (2011) mentioned that the separation of ownership and control, which occurs as a result of the introduction of external investors, brings to the fore the agency problem: managers are expected to represent the interest of the external owners. Kieiman (2011) explains Agency theory to suggest that the firm can be viewed as a nexus of contracts between resource holders. An agency relationship arises whenever the principals hire agents, to perform some services and then delegate decision-making authority to the agents. The primary agency relationships in business are those between stockholders and managers; and between debt holders and stockholders. Eisenhardt (1989) mentioned that there is likely to be conflict between the interests of principals and agents. However, the management decisions of a bank should be in line with the Principal-agent relationships and should reflect efficient organization of information and risk-bearing costs. 
Literature Review
Awoyemi (2009) CR is the dependent variable, the variable we wish to explain or predict which is credit risk management (NPL, LLP, LDR).
CG is the independent variable, also called the predictor variable; which is, corporate governance (SC, CI, BS, BC, ED, DI,). Each of the equations is applied for the relevant hypothesis test 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Ordinary Least Square analysis was carried out on the panel data using Eviews 7.
Credit Risk Management Variables

Non-Performing Loans Ratio (NPL)
Chang (2006) The Central Bank of Nigeria requires all banks to make provisions for their loans according to the loan classification: Performing loans (past due <1day-89days) to be set at 1%; Standard loans (past due >90days-179days) to be set at 10%; Doubtful loans (past due >180days-359days) to be set at 50%; Lost loans (past due (>360days) to be set at 100% (CBN Prudential Guideline, 2010).
Loans to deposits ratio (LDR)
Loans are represented by total loans and advances in notes to the financial statement, whilst the deposits include demand deposits, time deposits, fixed deposits, current deposits, and savings. The total deposits value is extracted from the liabilities section of the balance sheet, referred to as customer deposits. 
Corporate Governance Variables
Statutory Committee (SC)
The Central Bank of Nigeria by the code of corporate governance 2006 requires each of the banks in Nigeria to have at least the following 3 committees: audit committee; credit committee; and risk committee. Therefore, data were gathered on the existence of these committees in each of the observations, checking whether the bank had none that is, 0; all 3; 1 or 2 of these committees.
Committee Independence (CI)
The Central Bank also requires that neither the chairman of the board nor the managing director/chief executive officer should be a member or chairman of any of the existing committees. This is to ensure independence of these committees of the board of directors. The committees of observations that had either the chairman or the managing director/chief executive officer as a member or chairman were regarded as dependent and represented by dummy value '0'; while the committees of observations that had neither the chairman of the board or the managing director/chief executive officer as a member or chairman are regarded as independent and represented by dummy value '1'.
Board Size (BS)
It is also required by the Central Bank that the board of directors of any bank in Nigeria does not exceed a total of 20 directors. Data were practically gathered by counting the number of directors listed as members of the board. The total membership of the board of directors includes: The chairman, the managing director/chief executive director, executive directors and non-executive directors.
Board Composition (BC)
It is required by the 2006 Central Bank of Nigeria code of corporate governance that the board of directors comprises of the chairman, the managing director/chief executive director, executive directors and non-executive directors. The chairman of the board is a non-executive director, while the managing director/ chief executive officer is an executive director. It is further stated that the number of non-executive directors should exceed that of executive directors. Hence, in gathering data, where the executive directors exceeded the nonexecutive directors or are the same number, it was represented by dummy value '0' and where the non-executive directors exceeded the executive directors, it was represented by dummy value '1'.
Executive Duality (ED)
The Central Bank of Nigeria, in the 2006 code of corporate governance also requires that the position of chairman of the board of directors and managing director/chief executive officer should not be vested in one person or two relates persons. Therefore in gathering data, the observations that had one person or two related parties as chairman of the board and managing director/chief executive officer were valued by dummy '0'. While, the observations that had two unrelated persons as chairman of the board and managing director/chief executive officer were valued by dummy '1'.
Directors' Interest (DI)
Though not mandated, it is clearly noted in the 2006 Central Bank of Nigeria code of corporate governance that the more the directors' shareholding interest in the bank, the better the with corporate governance principles. Hence, it was further stated that the directors are advised to acquire shares in the banks they are directing. In data gathering, the total shareholding of all the directors was summed and expressed as a percentage of total shares of the bank. 
Control Variable
For this research, bank size was considered a relevant control variable and it was measured by banks' total assets (TA). 
Results
Test of Hypothesis 1
H01:
There is no significant relationship between corporate governance and nonperforming Loans ratio.
CR (NPL)it = α + βSCit+ βCIit + βBSit + βBCit + βEDit + βDIit + βTAit +μit The coefficients of BS, CI, DI and TA show that there is an inverse relationship with non-performing loans ratio. This implies that as the number of directors on the board increases, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans will fall and vice versa. The independence of the board committees influences a reduction in non-performing loans ratio and vice versa. As shareholding interests of the directors increase, ratio of non-performing loans to total loans falls and vice versa; also as bank total assets increase, non-performing loans ratio falls and vice versa. BC, ED and SC show a positive relationship. As the number of non-executive directors increases in greater proportion to the executive directors, non-performing loans ratio increases and vice versa. Clear separation of powers between the chairman board of directors and the CEO influences an increase in non-performing loans ratio.
Compliance with the statutory committees increases the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.
The 0.036595 Prob (F-statistic) is significant at 5%, and this represents 95% level of significance. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between corporate governance and nonperforming loans ratio is rejected. Therefore, it is concluded that there is a significant relationship between corporate governance and non-performing loans ratio. The regression result proves that as corporate governance policies are complied with, there is a significant impact on non-performing loans ratio. The R-squared proves that corporate governance is responsible for 15.4% change in non-performing loans ratio. The 0.009918 Prob(F-statistic) is significant at 1% and this represents 99% level of significance. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between corporate governance and loan loss provision is rejected. Therefore, it is concluded that there is a significant relationship between corporate governance and loan loss provision. The regression result proves that as corporate governance compliance improves, there is a significant impact on provision for loan losses and vice versa. The R-squared proves that corporate governance is responsible for 18.7% change in loan loss provision.
Test of Hypothesis 3
H03: There is no significant relationship between corporate governance and loans to deposits ratio. CR (LDR)it = α + βSCit+ βCIit + βBSit + βBCit + βEDit + βDIit + βTAit +μit The 0.017647 Prob (F-statistic) is significant at 5%, and this represents 95% level of significance. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between corporate governance and loans to deposits ratio is rejected. Therefore, it is concluded that there is a significant relationship between corporate governance and loans to deposits ratio. The regression result proves that as corporate governance compliance improves, there is a significant impact on loans to deposits ratio. The Rsquared proves that corporate governance is responsible for 17.3% change in loans to deposits ratio.
Conclusion
This 
